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Abstract. The emission targets adopted in the Kyoto Protocol 1 far exceed the likely level of emis-
sions from Russia and Ukraine. These countries could sell their surplus if the Protocol is followed and 
industrialized countries establish an international emission trading system. Critics have condemned 
the potential sale and dubbed the surplus 'hot air' because it does not represent any reduction in 
emissions below the level that would have occurred anyway. Using the most recent, comprehensive 
regional scenarios2 for the emissions of carbon dioxide from the energy system, we estimate that 
during the Protocol's 2008-2012 'budget period' the surplus will range from 9 MtC (million tons of 
carbon) to 900 MtC for Russia and from 3 MtC to 200 MtC for Ukraine. Even scenarios with high 
economic growth and carbon-intensive technologies do not exhaust the surplus before the budget 
period. In the central ('middle course') scenario, the total carbon surplus exceeds 1000 MtC and is 
worth 22 to 170 billion U.S. dollars (4 to 34 billion U.S . dollars per year). This flow of revenues, 
which could exceed Russian earnings from natural gas exports ($10 billion in 1997 3 ), is compar-
able with the projected total investments of the Russian energy system for 2008-2012. If directed 
towards low-carbon infrastructure investments (e.g., gas pipelines), surplus transfers could reinforce 
and partially lock-in decarbonization of the world energy system. 
1. Introduction 
The 1997 Kyoto Protocol to the Framework Convention on Climate Change 
(FCCC) 1 requires that the industrialized countries listed in Annex I of the con-
vention cut their annual emissions of greenhouse gases by an average of about 5% 
below the 1990 level during 2008-2012. Annex B of the Protocol allocates that 
collective target among 38 countries. This target applies to sources and sinks of 
six greenhouse gases; for simplicity, we consider only the most important human 
cause of global warming in this analysis: C02 released during the combustion of 
fossil fuels. 
The Protocol allows the creation of various systems for emissions trading in 
which countries that exceed their Annex B target can remain in compliance by 
purchasing surplus permits from other Annex B countries (Articles 4, 6, and 17). 
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As with any trading system, the fl.ow and value of emission permits will depend 
upon their initial distribution, supply, and demand. Here, we focus on one aspect of 
the potential trading system that has been the most politically sensitive: the number 
and value of permits that were allocated to Russia and Ukraine, which we term 
the 'carbon surplus' . (Observers politically hostile to this allocation of assets have 
dubbed it 'hot air'.) 
2. Estimating the Surplus 
The Kyoto commitments require that both Russia and Ukraine freeze their emis-
sions at the 1990 levels. Because of the economic disarray with the collapse of 
the Soviet empire and central planning, C02 emissions peaked in the late 1980s, 
declined sharply in the early 1990s, and are likely to remain below 1990 levels in 
the near future. 
The size and value of the surplus will depend on the level and timing of 
economic recovery relative to the 2008-2012 'budget period' as well as on techno-
logical choices. Because these factors are especially difficult to predict, we employ 
six scenarios developed at the International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis 
(IIASA) and World Energy Council (WEC) that are especially suited for long-
term regional- and global-scale analysis of the energy system. They encompass 
three cases of future developments (A, B, and C) subdivided into six alternative 
scenarios (Al, A2, A3, B, Cl, and C2). Case A envisions a future of impressive 
technological improvements and consequent high economic growth. It has three 
variants, which reflect alternative futures for fossil fuel resources that can be tapped 
as well as non-fossil technologies. In scenario A 1, oil and gas are abundant and 
remain the dominant fuels. In scenario A2, oil and gas are scarce and thus coal 
becomes the dominant primary fuel. In scenario A3, improvements in non-fossil 
technologies (renewables and nuclear) lead to the long-term elimination of fossil 
fuels for reasons of economy rather than scarcity. Case B is a central 'middle 
course' scenario. Case C envisions a 'green' future with substantial technological 
progress, unprecedented international cooperation to protect the environment, and 
measures to attain international equity. In Scenario Cl, nuclear power is a transient 
technology that is replaced by non-nuclear low-carbon technologies such as solar 
hydrogen, while in scenario C2 new reactor technologies lead to sustained growth 
in nuclear technology over the same period. For the near-term Kyoto period, the 
most important differences between the scenarios are the level of economic growth 
(high in A, moderate in B and C) and the technologies employed (high carbon in 
A2; medium carbon in Al and B; low carbon in A3, Cl, and C2). 
The IIASA-WEC scenarios are especially useful for analyzing the demand for 
and supply of the carbon surplus because they provide both global coverage and 
harmonized regional detail. For each scenario, the IIASA-WEC team quantified 
basic assumptions (e.g., population and GDP) and calculated outputs (e.g. , C02 
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TABLE I 
IIASA-WEC Scenarios, summary of the main indicators for 2020 and 2050. The A and B series are 
'non-intervention' (i .e., they do not include policies to limit carbon dioxide beyond what nations 
already implement today). Series C includes a tax that rises steadily, beginning after 2000, to $200 
per ton of carbon emissions by 2100. Some proceeds from the tax are distributed to developing 
countries to compensate them for the costs of slowing global warming. FSU =Former Soviet Union 
Case 
A B c 
High growth Middle course Ecologically driven 
Population, billion Global FSU Global FSU Global FSU 
1990 5.3 0.29 5.3 0.29 5.3 0.29 
2020 7.9 0.35 7.9 0.35 7.9 0.35 
2050 JO. I 0.39 JO.I 0.39 10.1 0.39 
GDP, trillion U.S.( 1990)$ 
1990 20.9 0.79 20.9 0.79 20.9 0.79 
2020 46.9 1.13 40.2 0.97 40.5 1.08 
2050 101.5 5.6 72.8 3.0 75 2.8 
Primary energy intensity, 
annual improvement 
1990-2020 -0.9% -0.3% -0.8% -0.9% -1.4% -1.1 % 
1990-2050 -1 % -1.9% -0.8% -1.7% -1.4% -2.2% 
Primary energy demand, Gtoe 
1990 9 1.4 9 1.4 9 1.4 
2020 15.4 1.9 13.5 1.3 11.4 1.4 
2050 24.8 3.1 19.8 1.9 14.2 1.3 
Technology costs 
Fossil Low Medium Medium 
Non-Fossil Low Medium High 
Environmental taxes No No Yes 
Net carbon emissions, GtC 
1990 5.9 1.0 5.9 1.0 5.9 1.0 
2020 8.2-9.9 1.0-1.2 8.3 0.8 6 .3 0.8 
2050 9.3-14.7 1.5-2.0 9.6 I.I 5.1-5 .3 0.7 
Number of scenarios 3 2 
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Figure 1. Annex I emissions of C02 due to the combustion of fossil fuels for the six IIASA/WEC 
scenarios (light lines) and actual emissions (heavy line) in gigatons (109 tons) of carbon (GtC). 
In the early 1990s, Annex I as a whole tracks the case C scenarios most closely because of the 
deep reductions in C02 in the reforming countries. Historical data are from Oak Ridge National 
Laboratory (through 1990, excluding cement manufacture)* and updated with data from the BP.3 
1991 data are interpolated because adequate data for the former Soviet region are unavailable. 
*Note: Marland, G., Andres, R. J., and Boden, T. A.: 1993, Carbon Dioxide Emissions, in Trends 
'93, A Compendium of Data on Global Change, Carbon Dioxide Information Analysis Center, Oak 
Ridge National Laboratory. 
emissions) through the iterative use2· 4· 5 of two models: (a) an 11-region version 
of the macroeconomic model 'Global 2100',6 and (b) IIASA's linear programming 
energy system model 'MESSAGE III'. 7 The scenarios were reviewed extensively 
by more than 100 regional experts in two rounds of publications in 1995 8 and 
1998.2 
Figure 1 shows the estimated carbon emissions for Annex I countries for these 
six scenarios. Table II reports the difference between those estimated emissions 
levels and the targets adopted in the Kyoto Protocol. The 'reforming' industrial 
economies of Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union are in surplus in all of 
the scenarios. The largest surplus in nearly every scenario is from the former Soviet 
Union. 
In principle, carbon surpluses could exist in many of the 8 East European and 
5 former Soviet countries listed in Annex B of the Kyoto Protocol. However, in 
practice, only Russia and Ukraine are likely to sell substantial quantities of surplus 
permits. The surplus in the East European region (Table II) is largely the con-
TABLE II 
Emissions of carbon dioxide due to the combustion of fossil fuels in the five regions that constitute Annex I 
('Industrialized') countries. The table shows emissions in 1990, the target adopted in Kyoto, and the level of 
emissions that arc in excess of (or below) the five-year Kyoto target. The targets are expressed as the percentage of 
change from 1990 levels and are weighted to account for two factors . (I) National targets vary within each region; 
in the absence of robust predictions for the future emissions of every country, we weighted the national targets 
according to 1990 emissions. (For illustrative purposes, when weighting targets we ignored the small fraction 
of emissions from the East European and former Soviet nations that are not subjected to Annex B targets.) (2) 
As permitted by the Decision of the Conference of the Parties to the FCCC,3 four countries in Eastern Europe 
(Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland, Romania) have selected non-standard base years. Emissions in those base years are 
higher (15% to 17%) than in 1990, which makes the Kyoto target for those countries, in effect, less stringent. If 
the base year adjustment were not allowed and all other factors had remained constant, the weighted Kyoto target 
for Eastern Europe would have been - 7%. C02 emissions are net values, which exclude feedstocks, gas used for 
enhanced oil recovery, and non-energy emissions 
1990 level Kyoto target Deficit (surplus) emissions 
(MtC per year) (weighted) (MtC, cumulative 2008-2012) 
Al A2 A3 B Cl C2 
Western Europe 956 -7.8% 1093 1351 687 731 -378 -368 
North America 1491 -7.2% 2388 2741 1402 1838 -940 -I 135 
Pacific OECD 372 -3.1 % 295 329 221 128 -217 -207 
Eastern Europe 284 3.3% -60 -47 -258 -345 -374 -368 
Former Soviet Union 1026 -0.2% -154 -7 -572 -1377 -832 -864 
Annex I, Total 4130 -4.7% 3605 4411 1523 1019 -2697 -2898 
a Conference of the Parties, FCCC: 1996, 'Decision 9/CP.2: Communications from Parties included in An-
nex I to the Convention: guidelines, schedule, and process for consideration', FCCC/CP/1996/15/Add.l, 
http://www.unfcc.de. 
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sequence of four nations (Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland, and Romania) adjusting their 
base years to dates prior to 1990 when emissions were higher, which has given 
these countries targets that are less stringent than suggested by Annex B (see cap-
tion to Table II). Those base year adjustments also account for why the collective 
C02 cut for all Annex I nations is only 4.7% below 1990 levels, rather than the 5% 
goal set in the Kyoto Protocol. The two largest of these countries (Hungary and 
Poland) are developing close economic ties with the European Union, which may 
make it politically difficult for them to sell their surpluses. The EU has steadfastly 
opposed the sale of such surpluses and has sought to limit the extent to which 
countries can use emission trading to satisfy their Kyoto obligations. These EU 
objections are based on the fear that completely free trading will result in surplus 
sales and that other accounting tricks that will undermine the Protocol's primary 
goal ofreducing emissions.9 Three of the former Soviet republics - the Baltic states 
of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania - listed in Annex B have stringent (-8%) targets 
and are unlikely to have much surplus available for sale. That leaves Russia and 
Ukraine with the only significant available surpluses. 
In 1990, Russia and Ukraine accounted for 650 MtC (63%) and 180 MtC (17%) 
of emissions from the former Soviet Union, respectively. 10 In comparison, official 
data reported by Russia to the FCCC indicates 1990 emission levels of 648 MtC 
(see ref. 19). Ukraine has not reported official emission estimates. Table III com-
pares the projected emissions in the six scenarios for these two countries with the 
Kyoto targets for 2008-2012. The range of numbers is indicative of a plausible 
range in the possible magnitude of the surplus. 
Figure 2 shows the scenarios for the former Soviet Union. The IIASA-WEC 
scenarios (especially B) track historical emissions closely. They are also systemat-
ically lower than most other scenarios, which suggests that other studies probably 
overestimate the emissions from this region for at least one of three reasons. ( 1) 
Some scenarios employ base years prior to 1990 when emissions were higher. (2) 
Most scenarios are long-term with the first reporting year being 2010 and thus do 
not provide the resolution needed to analyze short-term targets such as in the Kyoto 
Protocol. (3) Even the few available shorter term scenarios have systematically un-
derestimated the depth of the economic recession (e.g., refs 11 and 12) or have not 
employed transparent data and methods to allow the reproduction of the numbers 
(ref. 13). 
For Annex I as a whole, only the 'green' scenarios (Cl and C2) lead to emis-
sions below the Kyoto targets, which suggests that, in the absence of emission 
trading, compliance with the Kyoto Protocol can be attained only with radical 
shifts in technology. In the other scenarios, some advanced industrialized nations 
(Australia, Japan, New Zealand, North America, and Western Europe) can attain 
compliance by purchasing permits from regions with surplus. However, in none of 
those scenarios are the Russian and Ukranian surpluses sufficiently large that all of 
the advanced industrialized nations can comply with the Protocol merely through 
the acquisition of the surplus permits. 
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TABLE III 
Russian and Ukrainian emissions of carbon dioxide from combustion of fossil fuels. Values (MtC) 
are the surplus relative to the Kyoto target for the six IIASNWEC scenarios. National figures are 
weighted from the total for the former Soviet region. The Kyoto target (0%) is slightly different 
from the value in Table II, because the latter includes the -8% targets for Estonia, Latvia, and 
Lithuania. We assume that Russia and Ukraine account for 63% and 17%, respectively, of the former 
Soviet Union on the basis of adjusted 1990 data from the International Energy Agency.a These 
data are probably uncertain by as much as 10% but are consistent with other sources. Using these 
fractions, we calculate that 1990 fossil fuel C02 emission levels were 650 MtC (Russia) and 178 MtC 
(Ukraine). These fractions and numbers are also consistent with historical data for the former Soviet 
Union compiled by Oak Ridge National Laboratory (see Figure 2 and ref. 38). The IIASA-WEC 
emissions are only reported on a decadal basis; we have interpolated these emissions to achieve 
estimates for the five-year period 2008-2012 
1990 level Kyoto target Deficit (surplus) emissions 
(MtC per year) (weighted) (MtC, cumulative 2008-2012) 
Al A2 A3 B Cl C2 
Russian Federation 650 0.0% -102 -9 -367 -877 -532 -552 
Ukraine 178 0.0% -28 -3 -101 -241 -146 -152 
Total 828 0.0% -130 -12 -468 -1117 -677 -703 
a International Energy Agency: 1992, Climate Change Policy Initiatives, OECD, Paris, p. 31. 
In order to estimate the resources that might flow as the carbon surpluses are 
traded, we consider several prices for permits. We use $20 per ton for the low 
price, which is within the range ($14 to $23) quoted in the much-cited study by the 
U.S. Council of Economic Advisers (CEA) on the cost of implementing the Kyoto 
Protocol. 14 Many analysts have criticized that study's assumptions, including the 
widespread availability of low-cost carbon abatement options and efficient markets 
in emissions permits (e.g., ref. 15). Indeed, McCracken et al. 16 use the same model 
as in the CEA analysis and compute low permit prices ($26 per ton in 2010) 
only when they make the implausible assumptions that trading by 2010 will be 
fully global, friction-free, and perfectly competitive. Because of this, we consider 
two other permit prices that are characteristic of the results using macroeconomic 
models for Kyoto-like runs with realistic assumptions: $50 per ton (optimistic as-
sumptions) and $150 (pessimistic assumptions, such as inefficient markets). Other 
studies of Annex I trading cite similar prices, 15 • 16 although the range of plausible 
permit prices remains wide because there is no agreement among experts on the 
cost of carbon abatement nor the near-term feasibility of establishing various forms 
of emission trading, including trading with developing countries. It is possible 
that during transient periods (including the 5-year Kyoto 'budget period'), permit 
prices could be much higher, especially if permit markets operate inefficiently or if 
270 DAVID G. VICTOR ET AL. 
1.4 ~-----------------,..-------,---------, 
1.2 
u 0.8 
.... 
<.!) 
0.6 
0.4 
0 .2 . 
0 
1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 
Year 
Kyoto target 
\1 
2010 
A2 
A1 
A3 
B 
C1 
C2 
2020 
Figure 2. Emissions of C02 from the former Soviet Union due to the combustion of fossil fuels in 
the six IIASA-WEC scenarios (light lines) and the actual emissions (heavy line) . We show the entire 
former Soviet region, because Russia and the Ukraine constitute the largest portion (80%), historical 
data for the separate republics are unavailable prior to 1992, and most models and scenario exercises 
(including IIASA-WEC) aggregate the region as one. (Data sources same as in Figure 1.) 
economies grow more rapidly than expected. Table IV shows the estimated values 
of the carbon surpluses with these assumptions . 
Each scenario yields a significant carbon surplus. The smallest surplus ( 12 MtC) 
occurs in scenario A2 (high economic growth and carbon-intensive technologies). 
The largest surplus is in the 'middle course' (B) scenario, which expert reviews of 
the IIASA-WEC scenarios 2 suggest is the most likely outcome. In this scenario, the 
continued weakness in the former Soviet economies dampens growth in emissions, 
while the stronger economic growth and continued use of carbon-intensive fuels 
(e.g., coal) in the West raises the demand for permits (if Western regions intend to 
comply with the Kyoto Protocol). 
For comparison, the 1999 projection by the U.S. Energy Information Admin-
istration (EIA) estimated that fossil fuel carbon emissions from the former Soviet 
Union would be 324 million metric tons lower than the Kyoto limits in the year 
2010, or approximately 1600 million metric tons if that average annual surplus 
is maintained over five years. That figure is higher than earlier EIA estimates, in 
part because the recession in the former Soviet Union has been longer and deeper 
and also because the recovery of these economies has made greater use of low-
carbon natural gas (rather than high-carbon coal) than EIA analysts had previously 
expected. 17 Our estimate for the entire former Soviet Union (1377 million metric 
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TABLE IV 
Estimated value of the Russian and Ukrainian carbon surpluses. We use three plausible permit 
prices; however, some combinations of pennit prices and scenarios are not realistic ('nr'). In the 
A2 scenario, for example, low pennit prices are implausible because high emissions would raise 
demand and pennit prices, perhaps above $150 per ton. In the C scenarios, the surplus is not needed 
for compliance with the Kyoto Protocol and thus pennit prices are likely to be low or zero 
Tax level Cumulative revenue 
(U.S.'90 $per tC) (billion 1990 U.S. Dollars, cumulative 2008-2012) 
Al A2 A3 B Cl C2 
Russian Federation 20 2 nr 7 20 nr nr 
Ukraine l nr 2 5 nr nr 
Total 3 nr 9 25 nr nr 
Russian Federation 50 5 0.5 20 40 nr nr 
Ukraine 0.1 5 10 nr nr 
Total 7 0.6 25 50 nr nr 
Russian Federation 150 IO 1 60 130 nr nr 
Ukraine 4 0.4 20 40 nr nr 
Total 14 1.8 80 170 nr nr 
tons, shown in Table II) is approximately the same. In contrast, McCracken et al. 16 
estimate that emissions from the former Soviet Union will be 247 million metric 
tons below the Kyoto target in 2010, or about 1000 MtC over five years. That 
figure is substantially lower than our 'middle course' estimate largely because the 
IIASA-WEC scenarios envision a much deeper recession in the former Soviet 
Union. (The reader should note that for purposes of the Kyoto Protocol, only the 
surplus from Russia and Ukraine, or about 80% of total emissions from the former 
Soviet Union in 1990, are sellable since only those countries have the lenient target 
and are also included in Annex B of the Protocol.) Recent in-depth studies of the 
Russian economy have identified pervasive structural weaknesses and suggest that 
the recovery will be weak, 18 implying that emissions will not rebound quickly and 
that the surplus will remain large. 
3. Discussion and Speculation 
We close with some speculation on factors that could affect the size and value of 
the surplus, and some thoughts on how the revenues might be usefully spent. 
Due to a lack of data and appropriate models for estimating future emissions, 
we have excluded the non-C02 greenhouse gases. However, we are mindful that 
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the Kyoto Protocol includes five gases in addition to C02, and our hunch is that 
the basic results would be unaffected if extended to include all gases. Russia's 
official 'communication' to the FCCC indicates that fossil fuel C02 accounted 
for 79% of all greenhouse gas emissions in 1990, with the balance due to CH4 
(18%) and N20 (3%). 19 (To allow a comparison with official reports, emissions 
of different greenhouse gases are converted into common units using the standard 
100-year 'global warming potentials' adopted by IPCC in 1995.20· 21 ) Other recent 
(1997) Russian studies confirm these proportions. 22· 23 Russia has not submitted 
emission estimates for the other three greenhouse gases included in the Kyoto Pro-
tocol (hydrofluorocarbons, perfluorocarbons or sulfur hexafluoride); however, in 
other industrial countries, emissions of these gases constitute only a small fraction 
( <3%) of the total emissions.19· 24 Ukraine has not submitted any official emissions 
inventory, but the proportions of fossil fuel C02 and other greenhouse gases are 
likely to be similar to those in Russia. In short, the non-C02 gases do not account 
for much of the total. However, we are also mindful of the results by Reilly et 
al.25 , who suggest that the surplus in the former Soviet Union could be reduced 
by nearly 60% when non-C02 gases are included in the calculation. Their result is 
mainly due to their accounting for methane; they employed abatement cost curves 
that are based on data from the United States, not the former Soviet Union, and 
which appear to result in higher calculated methane emissions. We are wary of 
their result and agree with Reilly et al. that more research is needed on this topic. 
In fact, it is plausible that the surplus could increase as large methane vents are 
closed at zero marginal cost - for example, the growth of the Russian economy 
may attract investment in more efficient and less leaky natural gas systems. The 
potential implications should be explored, but quantifying them is beyond the scope 
of this paper. 
We have also excluded from our analysis C02 due to land use change and 
forestry, even though the Kyoto Protocol includes these fluxes. Accounting rules 
for sinks in the Kyoto Protocol are still hotly contested, and the net carbon content 
of Russian lands (especially forests) is highly uncertain and variable with time. 
Some studies suggest that Russian forests were a large net carbon sink (184 MtC 
yr- 1) in the early 1990s.26 A recent survey by the Russian government concluded 
that the net sink was 110 MtC sink in 1990 and that it rose 50% in the early 1990s 
due to the decreased logging of Russian forests. 23 Other Russian studies also sug-
gest a large sink for the early 1990s (160 MtC in 1993).27 Russia's official FCCC 
communication reports a net sink of 107 MtC in 1990. The most comprehensive 
independent analysis concludes that Russian forests were a net source of 69 MtC 
per year for 1988 to 1993 (see methodology in ref. 28, updated with a critical 
review of other studies in ref. 29.) The range of these numbers (approximately 
200 MtC per year, or 1000 MtC over five years) suggests that uncertainty in the 
forest carbon flux is comparable with our largest estimate for the Russian and 
Ukranian carbon surplus for the five-year Kyoto budget period. The net carbon 
flux from land use and forestry - especially the large Russian forests - is simply 
unknown at present. 
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The high uncertainties regarding forest carbon and the non-C02 gases pose 
technical and political problems for emission trading. As Reilly et al. 25 have calcu-
lated, in principle there are large potential benefits from a multigas comprehensive 
approach. In practice, however, the inclusion of these other fluxes probably results 
in much more uncertain (and potentially much larger) surplus emission allocations, 
which could make it much more difficult to negotiate a politically acceptable distri-
bution of emission permits. These problems suggest that it may be wise to restrict 
emission trading to those fluxes that can be monitored accurately and reliably - at 
present, the emissions of C02 from fossil fuels. 
The value of the carbon surplus will depend not only on the supply and de-
mand in the Annex B nations, but also on the design and operation of permit 
markets. Here, we indicate three of the several factors that will be important. First, 
sellers and buyers might act strategically. Russia and Ukraine - as the largest An-
nex B sellers - could restrict supply and exert monopoly power on permit prices. 
McCracken et al. 16 investigated the consequences of such behavior and estimated 
that a monopolistic behavior by Russia and Eastern Europe would raise permit 
prices by one-third (in an Annex I-only trading system, from $73 per ton to $105 
per ton), with a 10% increase in profits from such strategic behavior - significant, 
but small compared with the other uncertainties in estimating the size of the sur-
plus. Major buyers, such as the United States, could also organize themselves to 
purchase blocks of permits at a discount, thus reducing revenue transfer. We think 
the former, like OPEC, is a plausible scenario, while the latter is unlikely since 
it would require intervention by liberal democratic governments into an otherwise 
free market; such intervention, by creating publicly controlled block payments, 
could be politically unattractive for those countries because it would focus public 
attention on the size of the surplus transfers. 
Second, the 'Clean Development Mechanism (CDM)' - a provision in the 
Kyoto Protocol that allows investors to earn credits for projects that reduce emis-
sions in developing countries - could provide additional supplies of emission 
permits, which would lower prices and shrink the valve of the Russian and Ukrain-
ian surplus. Many studies have shown that enormous low-cost potential reductions 
exist in developing countries; this vast reservoir could create a cap on the permit 
price of only a few dollars per ton, which would also limit the five-year surplus 
transfer to perhaps ten billion dollars or less. The prospect of a CDM could also 
limit the extent of monopolistic behavior by sellers. However, the success of the 
CDM requires forging agreement on the rules that would govern the system, and 
there are many thorny unresolved problems such as how to determine the baseline 
emissions in a developing country that would have occurred without the investment 
project. 
Third, provisions for banking (Article 3.13 of the Kyoto Protocol 1) could re-
duce the supply of surplus permits during the first Kyoto budget period, raise prices, 
and potentially increase the value of the windfall. Banking could also make the 
carbon surplus politically more palatable in the West, because it would no longer 
274 DAVID G. VICTOR ET AL. 
be viewed as a pure windfall. Assuming that Russia and Ukraine will need their 
surpluses at some point in the future - because emissions will rise eventually, 
targets will be tightened, or both - selling a bankable surplus today would no longer 
represent a costless opportunity. However, we doubt that this will have an important 
political effect since emission targets - and thus also permit allocations - are slated 
to be renegotiated every five years rather than set in advance for long periods of 
time. As any bureaucrat skilled in protecting his budget knows, the existence of an 
unspent windfall in one budget period will result in its removal later on. Therefore, 
Russia and Ukraine will have a strong incentive to sell what windfall they have 
rather than banking and losing it later. 
Our analysis may also help identify the date when Russia and Ukraine will be 
unable to comply with the Kyoto Protocol without implementing actions to regulate 
their carbon dioxide emissions. In the absence of external pressure (e.g., trade sanc-
tions), we expect that Russia and Ukraine will exit at the moment when the surplus 
is exhausted and windfall revenues trickle to zero. Studies on Soviet participation 
in international environmental agreements demonstrate that the country complied 
with international agreements when it was strictly in its interest to do so; this is 
a pattern that continues in Russia today.30 This line of argument suggests that 
Russia and Ukraine will exit the Kyoto Protocol as early as 2011 (A2 scenario), 
or, even earlier if the surplus is sold in advance. 31 Their exit might be averted by 
internal pressure to comply with environmental agreements, which is evident in 
advanced democracies where public interest environmental groups are politically 
strong. Such groups are generally weak and inactive on the global warming issue in 
the former Soviet Union. Designers of the trading system should contemplate such 
scenarios since they suggest that the system must account for the potential turmoil 
caused when a major supplier defects. 
Although we are skeptical that the Kyoto Protocol could be ratified if it delivers 
such a huge windfall to Russia and Ukraine, suppose that it were and suppose 
that a public program were created to manage the proceeds from the surplus. 
What could be done with the money?32 The starting point for one answer to this 
question is the observation from other studies that the Kyoto Protocol's targets, 
by themselves, will have little impact on the long-term concentration of carbon 
dioxide in the atmosphere.33 Perhaps more could be done to increase the long-term 
leverage on carbon emissions. One approach would be to tie the carbon surplus 
to investments in low-carbon infrastructures (e.g., gas pipelines), which could fa-
cilitate decarbonization of the world energy system. Indeed, the surplus revenues 
are comparable in magnitude with the entire investment being made in the energy 
system of the former Soviet Union. For the 6 IIASA-WEC scenarios, the MES-
SAGE model computes that investments in the energy system of the entire former 
Soviet Union during 2008-2012 range from $117 billion (scenario B) to $206 
billion (scenario A3). Investments in zero-carbon energy and low-carbon natural 
gas range from $80 billion (scenario B) to $120 billion (scenario A3). Earmarking 
could yield additional pipelines to transport vast Russian resources of low-carbon 
THE KYOTO PROTOCOL EMISSION ALLOCATIONS 275 
natural gas to Asia - which cost approximately $10 billion per 1000 km - and thus 
supplant carbon-intensive coal, which would slow global warming and also combat 
Asian acid rain. The main advocates for emissions trading, including Russia and 
the United States, have indicated their opposition to earmarking carbon trading 
revenues. 34 However, so far, there has been no discussion at a high political level to 
explore whether and how linking revenues with investments might be feasible. By 
reinforcing the long-term objective of the FCCC and avoiding a simple transfer of 
billions of dollars, such earmarking could raise the political feasibility of emissions 
trading under the Kyoto Protocol. 
We conclude by underscoring the modest and simple purpose of this paper: to 
estimate the size of pure windfall for Russia and Ukraine under the Kyoto Protocol. 
We have had the benefit of the 1998 IIASA-WEC energy scenarios, which are 
based on detailed regional analysis and are especially appropriate for probing the 
possible energy future of the former Soviet Union. We are mindful of the many 
remaining uncertainties, not the least being how the former Soviet economies will 
develop over the next decade. Nonetheless, our results strongly suggest that the 
windfall may amount to tens of billions of dollars, perhaps much more. 
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